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THE RECENT EVOLUTION OF FRENCH 
UNIVERSITIES 
The French agency for the modernisation of universities1 (Agence de Modernisation 
des Universités et des Etablissements, AMUE) was created in June 1997 as an 
expansion of a former structure called GIGUE (Groupement pour l’Informatique de 
Gestion des Universités et des Etablissements). It is in charge of diffusing 
management software dedicated to universities and offering services to universities 
in order to improve their management and internal practices. This agency engaged 
research aimed at developing knowledge on the situation of the French university 
system at the time when it was initiated. One of these research conventions was 
dealing with “university government” and our centre, the Centre de Sociologie des 
Organisations was chosen to conduct this endeavour. We thus organized two large 
field work projects. In 1998, a qualitative study based on 250 interviews was led in 
four universities with the help of graduate students of Sciences-Po Paris. A 
comparative report was written (Mignot-Gérard and Musselin 1999) for the AMUE. 
Drawing on the results of this first study, we built a questionnaire which was sent to 
37 universities in 1999. We received 1660 answers (on 5000 questionnaires sent), 
about 1100 from academics and 560 from members of the administrative staff (see 
the methodological annexe at the end of the paper). A second report was written in 
2000 and delivered to the AMUE (Mignot-Gérard and Musselin 2000).  
This provides us with a large empirical corpus on French universities that we can 
compare with the narrower corpus E. Friedberg and C. Musselin (1989) accumulated 
on the same topic in the eighties. This comparison clearly reveals that one should 
not give too much weight to the overwhelming discourse on the “impossible reform” 
of French universities2, on their endemic immobilism, and even on the conservative 
nature of the academic profession. Change has occurred and university government 
has evolved in France. This of course does not mean that all problems are solved, 
but that the potential ways to change, the relevant actors to mobilize, the existing 
margins of action and their realm are not the same as they were fifteen years ago. 
But before arriving to such conclusions and further argument on it, we first have to 
give evidence for change.  
In this perspective, we will first quickly describe some of the main changes that 
affected French university system in the last decade. We will then be able to point 
out the more striking developments that can be observed on university government 
when comparing the results of the field research led by E. Friedberg and C. Musselin 
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in the eighties and the conclusions raised by the qualitative and quantitative studies 
we led by the end of the nineties for the AMUE. The main conclusion we will make 
is that the previous conception of French universities as a kind of administrative 
grouping of facultés has been modified in favour of a more, cohesive, collective, 
institutional conception. As in others countries, this strengthened the university 
leadership, allowed the elaboration of strategic plans, increased self-governance etc. 
But, let us state here that, contrary to other countries, this did not result from the 
implementation of New Public Management or of New Managerialism : there is for 
instance nothing like the Jaratt report in the United Kingdom, or like the Dutch 
reform of university structures to foster a more executive leadership. The whole 
process which we will study here through its outcomes is much more a 
transformation of rather anomic universities into institutions with their own identity, 
perspectives, dynamics3: from this point of view we can say that French universities 
gained more autonomy, even if the formal allocation of attributions and functions 
between them and the State did not change dramatically.  
Nevertheless and even if we can observe important evolutions, we still can 
identify limits and problems that hinder this process and restrain the self-governance 
capacity of French universities: that is what we will show in a third and last section, 
pointing out some aspects that slow down or even impede the emergence of more 
cohesive universities. 
 
1. THE CONTEXT : NO BIG INSTITUTIONAL REFORM BUT SOME 
RADICAL CHANGES 
The aim of this article is less to explain why evolution is to be observed than to 
document their existence and their limits. We would like nevertheless to quickly 
mention three important changes that characterize the global evolution of French 
higher education within the two last decades and that favoured the existing change. 
The first deals with what has been sometimes described as a “second 
massification” (the first one was related to the rising numbers of students that 
occurred in the sixties) that French universities experienced between 1988 and 1995, 
followed by decreasing numbers of entrants. There are about two million students 
presently in the French higher education system, 1.5 million of whom are attending 
the university. As shown by Kogan and Hanney (2000), student expansion is an 
important factor for change. 
A second factor is the surprising increasing role of local actors. It became 
completely obvious with the University 2000 policy launched in the beginning of the 
nineties to improve the university patrimony and to plan new construction in each 
region : local authorities were associated and largely contributed to the realization of 
the plans. But in fact it had already began in the eighties (Filâtre1993), despite the 
fact that the decentralization law of 1982 attributed no competencies on higher 
education to the local authorities. Now, with perhaps the exception of the Parisian 
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region, universities can no longer ignore their local implantation and even search for 
interactions with and support from their local authorities4. 
A third and last factor to mention is that even if no important institutional reform 
was initiated after the 1984 Act, some limited (in scope and publicity given to them) 
decisions were made to increase the institutional autonomy of the universities. One 
of the more important of these has been the introduction of four-year contracts by 
the end of the eighties, which, albeit a subdued and not visible change, introduce 
some radical modifications in weakening the discipline-based logic of intervention 
of the ministry and promoting the recognition of universities as relevant actors 
within the French higher education system (see Musselin 2001 for a detailed 
argumentation of this thesis).  
From our point of view these three developments set the global context within 
which the government of French universities developed within the last two decades. 
2. THE MORE STRIKING CHANGES WITHIN UNIVERSITIES 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the comparison of the description and analysis 
E. Friedberg and C. Musselin proposed of the French universities in the eighties 
with the results of our more recent field work. First of all, most of the characteristics 
stressed by the two authors can not be sustained anymore. In particular, the role of 
the presidents has evolved, the deliberative bodies no longer prefer to avoid 
decisions, universities are active in domains they previously ignored or considered 
as “taboos” and they more than ever before behave as collective actors able to 
develop collective strategies. Before developing these three aspects, we will first 
quickly describe the structure of French universities as it has been set by the 1984 
act (the Savary Law). 
2.1. The structures of French universities according to the 1984 act 
From a broad perspective we can say that French are organized in facultés (called 
UFR for Unité de formation et de recherche) which can represent part of a discipline 
(for instance UFR of Modern History), a discipline (History) or a set of disciplines 
(UFR for Social Sciences).  
The university is led by a president. S/he is a an academic of the university, 
elected for a five year none renewable mandate5 by an assembly made of all the 
elected members of the three university deliberative bodies, that we will describe 
later on. The president works with a group (called bureau) whose composition can 
vary from one university from another because it is set by each university own 
statutes : s/he proposed the names of the people s/he would like to be elected at the 
bureau.  
The UFR (faculté) are led by a dean who is elected by the UFR council for a 
five-year mandate that can be renewed once. S/he is an academic of the UFR. Very 
often the UFR are organized in sections or departments with department or section 
heads. 
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This academic leadership can (or has to) rely on two other devices which are also 
present at the university and at the facultés levels. 
First an administrative apparatus which is led by the secrétaire général, an 
administrator who is a civil servant. At the university level, we find the central 
administrative units of the university (with standard functions : budget, personnel, 
pedagogical affairs…). In each UFR, there is a UFR administrator, who can be 
assisted by staff replicating the central structure (budget, pedagogical affairs …) and 
further administrative staff at the department or section level and within the research 
institutes.  
Second a deliberative structure. At the university level, we find three bodies. 
Two of them (the Conseil scientifique, or Academic council, and the Conseil des 
Etudes et de la Vie Universitaire, called CEVU or Board of studies) prepare 
proposals that then have to be decided upon by the third one, the Conseil 
d’administration or Governing board. The CEVU has between 20 to 40 elected 
members6, 75 to 80 % of them being academics or students representatives (each of 
these two categories having the same number of seats), 10 to 15 % being 
representative of the administrative staff and 10 to 15% being “external 
personalities”. Its mostly elaborates proposals dealing with curricula and diverse 
aspects of the students life on the campus. The Academic council consists of 20 to 
40 elected members, 60 to 80 % of them being representative of the university staff 
(with at least half of these seats for professors), 7.5 to 12.5 % of graduate students 
representatives and 10 to 30 % of “external personalities”. This body elaborates 
proposals dealing with the research policy and budgets of the university. The 
Governing board counts 30 to 60 elected members7, among them 40 to 45% of 
academics, 20 to 30 % of “external personalities”, 20 to 25 % of students, 10 to 15 
% of administrative staff. The law stipulates that the university statutes must foresee 
the representation of the disciplines present within the institution. It decides upon 
the proposals made by the two other bodies, but mostly deals with resources and 
especially with the budget and positions allocations. Each body elects a vice-
president (generally proposed by the president, in order to constitute a cohesive 
presidential team). 
At the faculty level, we also find a deliberative body : the conseil d’UFR or 
Faculté council, with no more than 40 elected members, 20 to 25 % of which are 
“external personalities”, the rest of the seats being equally divided between the 
academics, the students and the administrative staff.  
This above has described the formal structure: it is time now to come to the 
change that affected the way they are utilized by the actors, the way the latter are 
articulating the different components of these structures, the rules of the games 
characterizing the government of French universities, i.e. the specific mix that 
results from the role played by academic leaders, the nature of the relationships they 
have with one another and with the academics in general, the decisions made by the 
deliberative bodies and how they interfere in or adjust with the actions of the 
academic leadership.  
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2.2. From reactive to proactive presidents 
When E. Friedberg and C. Musselin conducted organizational studies in the eighties, 
the Faure Law of 1968 was about to be replaced by the Savary law, adopted by the 
French Parliament in 1984. Even if it only remained in effect for 16 years the Faure 
law has been very important for French universities. Before 1968, the French 
“university” system in fact consisted of strong faculties that were led by powerful 
deans and that were the relevant levels of decision between the ministry and the 
academics. Universities were a weak administrative level, a territorial gathering of 
faculties, under the control of a high civil servant called the “recteur”. The Faure 
law abolished the old faculties and favoured the creation of multidisciplinary 
universities led by an elected president, always an academic.  
This rapid summary of the history of the universities first points out that the 
presidential function is quite new in France and second that it was created from 
scratch while the deans come from a long tradition. Most of the memoirs written by 
the early presidents (see for instance Rémond 1979 or Merlin 1980) underline the 
quite difficult time they experienced in the seventies. They simultaneously had to 
impose this new function while at the same time the Faure law no longer allowed 
decision-making by peers and obliged them to adopt participative decision-making 
including the full professors but also students, non professor faculty and 
administrative staff. The confusion and sometimes even the conflicts and the 
political opposition that characterized the seventies were no longer to be observed 
when E. Friedberg and C. Musselin led research in the mid eighties. But the decisive 
role the presidents were supposed to play following the Faure law, was not to be 
observed either. They remained close to the traditional style of academic leadership, 
i.e. mediators of internal conflicts and representatives of university interests outside 
the university, but not managers or leaders. They mostly prefer to stay in the 
background. 
This is no more the case for most of the French presidents who are presently in 
office. First, the way they speak about their function, their conception of their role 
reveals that they feel more or less similar to managers who have to run projects, to 
define orientations and priorities, to intervene and make decisions. They do not 
present themselves as the exact reflection of their peers’ preferences and adopt a 
rather interventionist conception of their task. The opinions of the (13) presidents 
who answered our questionnaire on questions dealing with the kinds of institutional 
autonomy they prefer are different from the majority of the answers we received : 
31% of them are in favour of more organizational and more financial autonomy 
against 23% for the whole sample; 15% of them are against more organizational and 
more financial autonomy against 26% for the whole sample. Moreover, 24 of the 
presidents (65%) of the 37 universities concerned by our quantitative study were 
said to be influential or very influential on major decisions made within the 
university.  
Second, they very much insist on the fact that they are not leading alone but 
working with a team, which is generally composed of the Vice-presidents, and very 
often of the leading administrators of the university. They insist on the fact that they 
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delegate the leadership of some activities and that they, at the same time, are 
involved in cooperative work. This collective feature of the university management 
is reflected by the distribution of the 1563 answers (academics and administrative 
staff) we received to the following question.  

















4.7 % 4.2 % 19.8 % 21.5 % 45.0 % 4.8 % 
 
Third, they usually consider that this is a full time function8 and stress the 
professionalization of the leadership. They may keep one or two courses to have 
contacts with students, but they are first of all presidents. They all stress that this 
function requires more competencies (technical, relational, managerial ones) than 
before. Not that they should do or know every thing but they can no more be an 
“enlightened amateur”: many insist on the importance of having been a vice-
president previously.  
There is thus a general trend towards a more active and more committed 
leadership at the presidential level. There is also a general trend to request more 
responsibilities and autonomy as stated by the recent “orientation paper” produced 
by the French Conference of University Presidents entitled “University autonomy 
and responsibility” (Conférence des Présidents d’Université, 2001). 
2.3. More decisional deliberative bodies 
In the eighties the university deliberative bodies featured two main characteristics. 
First, they were described as “rubberstamp chambers” and had a pretty poor 
reputation among the university : elected academic members sitting in them were 
frequently qualified as “poor researchers who have nothing else to do”. Second, their 
main style of making decision was “no decision”, which meant either following 
decisions made by the ministry and replicating them9 or making no choice between 
concurrent projects issued from the departments and leaving the decision to the 
ministry, or discussing for hours without coming to any final choice.  
Here again, such conclusions do not fit the present situation anymore. About 
70% of the persons who answered the quantitative study we led, and who are not 
elected members of deliberative bodies said that they think that the three councils 
work well. The  Governing board more particularly is qualified as “a place where 
decisions are made” in 78% of the answers and “as an important body” in 82% of 
the cases.  
Moreover, and perhaps also more important, “no decision” is no more the 
favourite response of deliberative bodies. This does not mean that decisions are now 
 THE RECENT EVOLUTION OF FRENCH UNIVERSITIES 7 
built up by the bodies themselves : they contain too many members to be able to do 
so, thus preparatory work is led by small groups before the plenary meeting. Such 
groups set up proposals and advice that are then presented and discussed within the 
concerned body and that generally are agreed upon with a large majority. To go 
further in details on this specific aspect, we have to distinguish the situation of the 
Academic council and CEVU on one hand, and the  Governing board on the other. 
Most of the decisions made by the Academic council and the CEVU consist in 
evaluations, ranking or opinions on projects presented by academics. Two kinds of 
criteria are generally taken into account. First the support such projects received 
from their own faculty : if a dossier has been very controversial in the faculty or was 
accepted with a small majority of votes by the faculty council, the Academic council 
or the CEVU will be reluctant to accept it. They will probably send it back to the 
faculté and ask for a less problematic project. Second, we observed that the 
Academic council or the CEVU frequently have developed and explicated their own 
criteria10 : they select the projects going to the ministry11.  
It is quite difficult to precisely tell which criteria are used because it first 
depends on the type of projects we look at, on whether we speak of the CEVU or of 
the Academic council, and on the preferences these two bodies have in each 
university. But we can say that clear and shared criteria are more likely to be found 
when the president has an explicit strategy : in such cases this strategy is accepted 
by the deliberative bodies and translated into criteria12.  
It is impossible to list precise criteria without considering specific cases, but we 
nevertheless can draw two general conclusions. First these criteria never deal with 
the scientific or pedagogical content of the project. Second, some items of our 
questionnaire give some indications on the aspects to which attention is given. We 
asked to rank the influence of five different criteria (from 1 for the most influential 
to 5 for the less influential) on decisions about the creation of a new curricula. Two 
items were mostly chosen: first, job possibilities for the diploma holders and second 
the expression of student demands. The ranking of the most influential criteria for 
the suppression of a curricula also stress two items: first diminishing numbers of 
students and second poor job possibilities.  
The existence of criteria on which decisions are made is important because it 
helps the preparatory work accomplished by a small number of the Academic 
council or the CEVU in restrained committees: they know what should be 
considered, the points they have to stress in the reports they will present to the 
plenary session. But it also gives some possibility of interacting for the elected 
members who are not part of the restrained committee : they know on which basis 
the restrained committee has been working and questions may be asked, 
modifications may be required if they think some points were not taken into account, 
they can interfere during the hearings of the projects’ leaders etc. Thus even if they 
most of the time follow the opinions proposed by the restrained group they feel they 
are part of the decision-making and that they play a role. 
The situation is in many respects different for the  Governing board. Not so 
much for the decisions based on the proposals made by the CEVU or the Academic 
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council. The Governing board members trust the opinions given by these bodies and 
follow them. But the Governing board also has to decide on other matters, and in 
particular on budget allocation and on the demands for new academic positions. On 
these issues, one can first observe that the Governing board makes decisions it did 
not make previously. In the eighties, most universities refused to rank the list of 
positions they requested, leaving the decision to the ministry. Now, ranking by 
priority is the norm. Moreover, each faculty provides its ranking and the Governing 
board is able to cross-rank and can even depart from the ranking order suggested by 
the faculté: positions qualified as “low priority” by a faculté may be considered has 
“high priority” by the Governing board.  
These assumptions on the greater decisional capacity of the Governing board 
have somewhat to be moderated by the following observations. Elected members 
within this body are generally less satisfied than members of the CEVU or the 
Academic council. Only 65% of them chose the item “the preparation of the meeting 
is satisfying” (against 68% of the Academic council members about the Academic 
council meetings and 72% of the CEVU members about the CEVU meetings). 
Decisions are generally voted with a very large majority, but, at the same time, 
members of the Governing board often feel “dispossessed”. As for the CEVU and 
the Academic council, decisions are prepared, but in many cases this preparatory 
work is done by the president’s team and the administration, not by elected members 
of the Governing board. The latter have thus to discuss proposals they were not 
involved in, for which they do not have enough technical competencies to present 
counter-arguments and even less to prepare counter-proposals : they feel obliged to 
rubberstamp decision whose logics and finalities they do not completely control13.  
Thus, deliberative bodies make more decisions now than before, but this does 
not mean that they are a force for proposals. They much more legitimate the 
proposals on which they vote than participate in their elaboration (Mignot-Gérard, 
2000).  
2.4. Emerging strategies on issues previously ignored14 
A third point to stress is the emergence of strategies at the university level on issues 
which were previously ignored. Four domains have been invested and lead to 
decisions influencing the functioning of the respective universities and leading to a 
set of internal decisions.  
The first domain deals with the research strategic plan. The introduction of four-
year research contracts15 between the central authority and each university in 1983 
fostered the definition of research priorities at the university level. Three different 
kinds of actions have been developed in this perspective: “discipline–based grouping 
of research centres in the same building (Maison de l’Economie, Maison des 
Sciences sociales…); constitution of interdisciplinary research centres (which are 
called fédérations or instituts thématiques, or ensembles etc.) aimed at giving more 
visibility and at enhancing relationships and cooperation among the concerned 
teams; finally the creation or the development of Research offices. The latter 
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generally follow two objectives: on one hand they are intended to bring some 
financial, technical and legal support to academics engaged in research contracts 
with firms, communities, the European commission etc ; on the other they should 
promote more transparency on research contracts within the university and 
encourage the academics to have their contracts managed by the university 
administration16 and thus to pay overhead” (Mignot-Gérard and Musselin, 
forthcoming). 
A second domain where institutional strategies are to be observed is what can be 
called “rationalization strategies”. Two kinds of measures can be distinguished. First 
the development of instruments intending to improve the decision-making processes. 
The introduction of managerial software (Gueissaz, 1999)17and the construction of 
indicators reflect this first orientation : figures, harmonized information, 
comparative data are produced and used to support decisions18. Second, there is a 
general trend towards better control and more effective analysis on the expenditures, 
as well as diversifying resources. Most universities have developed strategies to 
reduce or adjust the budget for overtime (heures complémentaires19), some also try 
to enforce supply group purchases… A vast array of decisions have been made by 
the presidents and their teams in such directions. 
Teaching is a third domain to be mentioned and a rather recent one. Some 
universities intend to change the development dynamic of their curricula: instead of 
adding new courses to a forever growing catalogue, they try to set priorities, to 
define which sectors or which diplomas should be expanded, to present a clearer 
offer... Moreover, teaching quality assessment and evaluation of teaching by the 
students are more and more implemented, not solely on the personal initiative of 
some isolated academics as was the case before, but more and more often as a 
university strategy, even if it is still rather rare as shown here. 
Table 2. Q36. “Does some formalized teaching evaluation procedure exist in your faculty ?” 
- Yes 22.9% 
- No 43.9% 
- There exists no formalized procedure but some teachers  
 developed an evaluation procedure for their own courses 26.7% 
- I do not know 4.8% 
 
Finally, human resources are also becoming a matter for decisions. We already 
mentioned that the deliberative bodies consider they have to rank by priority the 
positions they each year ask the ministry to create20. We must add that 
redistributions of existing positions (administrative or academic ones) may occur 
within a university now while it seemed quasi impossible before21.  
A whole range of issues for which no decision were made before thus became 
part of the intervention realm of the university management. 
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2.5. Collective priorities orienting decision-making 
A last point deals with the emergence of a more collective conception of 
universities. As in other countries (Altbach, 1996), French academics have a dual 
commitment, one to their discipline and one to their institution. The former has 
almost always existed; the second is more present than before now. The four-year 
contracts introduced by the central administration by the end of the eighties favoured 
this evolution (Chevaillier, 1998).  
In order to sign a contract with the French ministry, each university must first 
prepare a kind of “strategic plan” which sets its priorities and main objectives for the 
four coming years. A first step in this process consists in an analysis of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the concerned institution from which a collective strategic 
orientation will be drawn. The main directive given by the central administration 
when it launched this new procedure was that the project should not be conceived as 
a juxtaposition of faculty projects. It should be an opportunity to enhance some 
collective reflection within each university, to go beyond the traditional faculty 
supremacy in French higher education (Musselin, 2001).  
The impact of these contracts, and more precisely of the process that surrounds 
them rather than the contracts by themselves (one should not forget that they still 
represent only 5 to 10% of the running budget  -which does not entail salaries- of 
French universities) is important. As shown by the following table, the contracts 
have a good image within the academic and administrative staff. 
Table 3 (based on Q114 and Q115) Opinions on four-year contracts 










1. are positive because 
universities have to project 
themselves in the future 
1583 78.9 7.5 13.6 
2. are positive because their 
preparation allows 
universities to better know 
themselves  
1566 72.2 11.3 16.5 
3. are positive because they help 
the deliberative bodies to 
make decisions 
1565 67.7 15.4 16.9 
4. serve as a reference to make 
decisions within the 
university 
1621 65.9 7.1 27.0 
5. enhance the university 
autonomy 
1549 60.5 18.8 20.7 
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Contracts are seen as a way to improve the government of the university as 
shown by items 1, 2 and 5. But they are also perceived as a reference to make 
decisions. The general opinion reflected in items 3 and 4 of table 3 is confirmed by 
the answers to the following question  
Table 4. Q92. In order to rank the needs for academic positions, what criteria does the 
Governing board first take into account22 ? 
1. the evolution of the student population or of the students per teacher ratio 90.1% 
2. the priorities set by the four-year contract 75.1% 
3. the research priorities 33.2% 
4. each faculty is given its turn 17.3% 
 
The impact of the contracts seems thus quite clear for the ranking of academic 
positions. It is nevertheless much weaker on the annual budget setting (it is quoted 
in 27,8% of the answers only). This suggests that contracts are more influential on 
the distribution of supplementary resources than on the redistribution of already 
existing resources. 
But these are not the only consequences induced by the contracts. They  also 
promote a more collective representation of the university. The projects that are part 
of the strategic plan are not only individual projects pushed by these or these 
academics: they have been recognized as projects of the whole university, relevant 
with the long term development of the latter, responding to the general objectives 
that have been set and defining the forthcoming orientation of the institution.  
The four main changes I identified in this second section are particularly striking 
when we compare our recent findings with the conclusions E. Friedberg and C. 
Musselin raised in the eighties. Patterns of decision-making within French 
universities have evolved and reflect the emergence of universities as collective 
actors and their increasing institutional autonomy (Berdahl, 1990), not so much 
because the ministry delegated more responsibilities but because universities (i.e. 
their leadership and the deliberative bodies) intended to mobilize margins of action 
they previously ignored. 
3. REMAINING BLOCKAGES 
The evolution which we described above should not hide that governing French 
universities and enhancing institutional autonomy remain a difficult task constrained 
by many limitations. 
The latter are partly due to external factors, such as the slow and back and forth 
reforms of the ministry itself. On one hand, it more than before recognizes 
universities as pertinent actors but still remains under the control of the disciplines: 
the role of the academic experts is still important and the balance between the 
discipline-based logic and the university-based logic is always redefined and still not 
stabilized. The ministry is also always ready to deliver a discourse preaching for 
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more autonomy but at the same time it maintains narrow and constraining rules. One 
can for instance wonder how French universities can be described as autonomous 
while they lack most prerogatives dealing with personnel issues : they need the 
agreement of the ministry to create new positions or to replace vacant ones; they can 
not recruit when they need to but must wait for the next national procedure, the 
recruitment procedures involve national bodies or even depend on national concours 
(for instance the agrégation du supérieur) on which universities have no influence. 
But the problems confronting French universities in becoming more cohesive 
and self-governed can not only be assigned to external factors. There exists also 
internal blockages.  
3.1. An evolution that lacks legitimacy 
In the second section of this text we pointed out some of the domains that are now 
invested by French universities, on which they make decisions and for which they 
define strategies. In particular, we stressed the development of research strategic 
plan, rationalization strategies, interventions on teaching, and emergence of human 
resource management. Such actions are largely supported by the president’s team 
and the administrators but are not considered as legitimate by many other actors.  
In the qualitative study on four universities, the only non controversial policy 
was the follow-up of the heures supplémentaires’ budget. The intervention on all 
other matters (research policy, teaching offer, introduction of software, supply 
grouping, redistribution of positions…) were severely criticized by most of our 
interviewees. 
This is confirmed by the quantitative study. Most of the time the intervention of 
the university is criticized. Here are for instance the answers to the following 
question  
Table 5. Q79. What are the priorities for which the research strategy of your university 
should aim” (answers from academics only) 
Constructing new buildings for the research institutes 39.1% 
Offering some legal help for the management of research contracts 25.5% 
Finding and negotiating new research contracts 20.3% 
Defining research themes 9.0% 
Others 6.1% 
 
This demonstrates that most people expect technical support from the university 
but no intervention on the content. The answers are also very clear on the expected 
role of the university on recruitment’s decisions: only 18.7% agreed that the search 
committees should be advisory bodies and that the university should decide on 
recruitments.  
On many aspects a strengthened role of the university level is not desired. More 
institutional autonomy is not firmly expected either. We had some questions dealing 
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with expectations on the organizational autonomy of the universities : for instance 
we asked whether universities should be free to determine their own status or 
whether they should leave the public accounting for the private one. We also had 
questions on financial autonomy (need for a diversification of resources, for more 
partnerships, etc.). Crossing these two perspectives, we obtained four groups of 
individuals:  
- a group opposed both to more organizational and to more financial 
autonomy: 26% of the answers 
- a group opposed to more organizational autonomy but in favour of more 
financial autonomy: 28% of the answers 
- a group in favour of more organizational autonomy and opposed to more 
financial autonomy: 23% of the answers 
- a group in favour of both more organizational and more financial autonomy 
: 23% of the answers 
Less than a quarter of the answering population expects a wide increase of 
institutional autonomy and a little more than a quarter wishes no change, while the 
rest of the population is in favour only of some kind of autonomy. Opinions are 
quite diversified on such issues and it is difficult for the university leaders to find 
consensus and to build legitimacy. 
3.2. Decisions easier to make than to implement 
A second problem to stress is that strategies are defined which obtain a large 
majority when they are discussed within the deliberative bodies, but they are 
nevertheless difficult to implement. Three main reasons may explain this 
discrepancy between the decisions made and their implementation. 
A first one deals with a high degree of individual resistance. This individual 
autonomy is enhanced by the fact that universities are weakly coupled organizations 
(Cohen, March and Olsen 1972; Weick 1976): many activities can be continued as 
before at the individual level because nothing constrains to change and because lack 
of change at this level does not affect other levels (or can not be seen by the latter). 
It is also enhanced by the fact that there exists possibilities to circumvent directives: 
in the qualitative studies, some academics explained that they avoid group purchases 
by buying their furniture with the CNRS budgets which are not managed by the 
university.  
A second reason deals with the presidents and their teams. They are pretty skilful 
at launching some participative processes that produce some collective choices, or at 
expressing some strategic views and setting priorities, but they do not give enough 
attention to the implementation itself. In the study S. Lipiansky and C. Musselin 
(1995) conducted on the preparation, the negotiation and the implementation of 
four-year contracts, it was clear that many projects were kept on stand-by because 
they lacked impetus from the university management which initiated them. For 
instance, a bureau for “industry-university relationships” was created, but the 
administrative staff who were assigned to it felt abandoned: they expected some 
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“political” orientation from the president and support when they were confronted 
with the uncooperative behaviours from the academics but had neither the former 
nor the latter. 
A third reason is linked to the rather difficult relationships between the group 
composed of the president, his team and the administrators on one hand, and the 
deans (and the academic and administrative staff within the faculties) on the other. 
Strategies defined at the university level are thus poorly relayed within the 
university. The first group rarely includes the deans and most of the time the latter 
are not associated with the decisions they make : they are only informed afterwards 
or a previously built proposal is submitted in order to see how they react. Most of 
the time this group states that the deans demonstrate low solidarity but at the same 
time does not wish to associate them more to decision making (Table 5). The deans, 
from their point of view, often regret not being associated to the university 
government but they also express some contradictory opinions: they would like to 
participate more but they would not like to show more solidarity with the views of 
the presidents (Table 5).  
Table 6. (based on Q130) : Opinions on the role and the behaviours deans should have 
 Faculties’ 
members 
Deans Administrators Presidents 
1. The deans should show 
solidarity to the 
president’s team  
45.6% 62.1% 76.5% 76.9% 
2. The deans should 
systematically be 
members of the 
president’s team” 
72.5% 86.0% 66.7% 61.5% 
 
These rather ambiguous situations and the poor cooperation between the 
president’s teams and the deans is detrimental to the implementation of strategies. 
3.3. Incremental decisions rather than radical ones 
Another point to stress deals with the kind of decisions made by the university 
management and the deliberative bodies as well. The decisions are most of the time 
incremental, which means that they rarely modify the previous existing balance and 
pretty much respect it and that there is a strong inertia. 
This holds particularly true for budget allocation: it most of the time reproduces 
the previous ones.  
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Table 7. Q50. Upon which criteria is the annual budget for your  
faculty established ? (see note 12) 
- the evolution of students numbers 93.5% 
- the previous year budget 65.8% 
- the criteria used by the ministry (Sanremo criteria) 48.9% 
- the priorities developed in the four-year contracts 27.8% 
- projects developed by the faculties 10.9% 
 
There are of course “good” reasons for this and one of them is to be found in the 
fact that once you have affected the budget for energy, maintenance, etc. there is 
little room left. But this is too easy an explanation. It is very hard indeed to 
introduce change, even when the situation of the various faculties is changing : 
increasing (or decreasing) numbers of students for instance do not automatically 
provoke a reconsideration of the budget allocation strategy23. What is difficult to 
obtain when “objective criteria” could be used to promote change is all the more 
uncertain if a president’s team wants to develop priorities and intends to reallocate 
resources in order to reach certain goals. In fact change seems to be able to occur 
only through the aggregation of minor transformations : the only way to assess this 
would be to conduct a longitudinal study of budget allocation within some 
universities in order to evaluate the scope of evolution and whether the marginal 
change introduced each year finally produce some new balance in the long run.  
The inertia assumption means furthermore that suppressions are almost 
impossible. A good example for this is the development of the curricula offer. It is 
very rare to terminate a course offering even when there are very few students. In 
their study F. Kletz and F. Pallez (2001 and forthcoming) describe the case of a 
deserted curricula : the faculty was almost ready to suppress it which means that no 
further agreement (habilitation) would be asked for to the ministry. But just before 
the decisive vote, the academics teaching in this course of study proposed to modify 
it, submitted a new proposal, and asked for the renewal of their agreement: the 
university accepted it. This is not simply an anecdote. Two pieces of quantitative 
evidence confirm this. On one hand, the statistical study led by R. Enaafa and F. 
Lefebvre (2001) concludes that most renewals for agreement are accepted (over 
85% of them and the authors explain that it is probably understated). On the other 
hand, our questionnaire came to the following results :  
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Table 8. On creations and suppressions of curricula (based on Q11 and Q16 
As far as you 
know, were…  
…new curricula created in 
your faculty within the past 
two years 
… curricula abolished in your 
faculty within the past two years 
First cycle 29.4 % 4.5% 
Second Cycle 43.7% 4.2% 
Graduate studies 43.7% 3.8% 
 
It seems thus much more difficult to suppress curricula than to create new ones 
and moreover, we observed that universities which have the highest rate of creating 
new courses, do not have a high rate of suppression.  
This leads us to a second remark: a more radical evolution is to be observed for 
decisions dealing with the allocation of supplementary resources than for the 
redistribution of existing resources. The creation of curricula for instance reveals a 
preference towards the development of job-oriented training and towards the second 
cycle and graduate studies. This should affect the balance between traditional 
curricula and other kinds of curricula in the middle term.  
The same holds true with the creation of new academic positions. We saw above 
that the priorities set in the contract play a rather important role in ranking the 
needed positions and that the rule “each faculty its turn” is rarely followed. 
A last example can be found with the four-year contracts. They set priorities, 
they propose orientations and are not a simple replication of what already exists. The 
impetus they give are also important to the introduction of change. 
Nevertheless, on the whole the decisions hardly change previous internal balance 
and produce only incremental change. 
3.4. Restricted access to decision-making process 
The last point we would like to mention deals with the actors involved in decision-
making. They are first of all administrators and academics of the concerned 
university. The relative indifference of the students elected in the deliberative bodies 
(as shown by their high absenteeism rates and by their rather weak influence on the 
decision process), but also the low participation of the so-called “outside 
personalities” (personnalités extérieures) who are supposed to represent the 
university environment and its demands both explain how closed decision-making 
processes remains.  
This should be tempered by the increasing interactions between the universities 
and their local environment: they are indeed obliged to more and more cooperate 
with their external world (all the more as it provides resources, essentially for 
research and for buildings) but if universities are ready to develop partnerships with 
their environment, they are not ready to associate them more closely to their internal 
decisions. For instance, 75.4% of the individuals agree with the following item 
(Q87) : “It’s alright to develop partnerships with our socio-economic and 
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institutional environment in order to improve the financial settings of universities” 
but we obtain the following answers to question Q 134:  
Table 9. Q134 : Political and economic leaders should be more 
 involved in university government ? 
Agree 29.0% 
Disagree 64.0% 
Do not know 7.0% 
 
Thus more partnership is expected as far as these partners do not interfere within 
internal affairs.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The picture we draw of French universities in this article is thus contrasted. On the 
one hand, many factors plead for a conclusion outlining important change, or at least 
more change than is usually stated (probably because most studies are focused on 
higher education reforms in France rather than on in-depth studies of universities). 
On the other hand, we show that, simply looking at internal factors, many obstacles 
and difficulties are still to be mentioned and could attack or slow down further steps 
towards more institutional cohesiveness.  
Some consequences can be raised from this evolution and we would like to focus 
on two of them. A first one deals with the increasing diversity of the French 
university system. It had already began by the sixties when the increasing numbers 
of students allowed the development of new curricula and the emergence of the so-
called “professionnalized” programmes. But this evolution was hidden in a way and 
remained so due to the national rules, national procedures, national diplomas, etc. 
that were supposed to guarantee a uniform national model. Diversity is now 
encouraged (universities are asked to develop their priorities, to show their 
institutional identity by the ministry) and recognized. This trend is not 
overwhelming because there still exists some acting forces towards uniformity (for 
instance the implementation of similar software, the fact that some university 
strategies are more a translation of the Ministry’s national injunctions than 
“personal” ones, the routinization of the management of the contractual procedure 
within the central administration…). Nevertheless, these “national” forces are not 
sufficient to prevent more differentiation than before 
A second consequence deals with the pertinent level for change and for policy 
making. The role of the ministry is still very important and we can probably say that 
the latter has less been affected by change than the universities but it can no more be 
described as the principal motor for change and for elaborating policies. Again, the 
recent proposals for more institutional autonomy stemming from the University 
Presidents Conference confirmed the emergence of the latter as a proposal arena 
while the difference between the scope of the strategic plan of a university and the 
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scope of the contract with the ministry (i.e. the aspects of the strategic plan that will 
receive financial funding from the ministry) shows that universities have room to 
define their own priorities and policies. 
We, of course, are not able to predict what will happen in the future and what the 
forthcoming evolution will be, but French universities will probably go further 
towards institutional autonomy in the coming years. Three reasons speak in favour 
of this hypothesis. First, in order to reverse the present trend, the ministry must 
regain the legitimacy and find the budgets that would allow it to return to the 
centralized steering of such a large system. Second, the university management 
enjoys its increasing autonomy and calls for more. Third the recent emergence of 
European agreements on higher education seems in contradiction with highly 
centralized systems. 
This evolution of French universities is of course important for the French higher 
education system: while universities were a rather weak structure, they now are 
relevant actors within this system while they increased their self governance 
capacity.  
Furthermore this specific experience has further implications. As a matter of fact, 
it speaks for a renewal of the models and theories we use to characterize and explain 
this kind of organizations. As stated by E. El-Khawas in a recent paper, we still have 
to learn from previous works and we should not too quickly abandon them because 
“the old theories still have something to offer” (2001: 10). But if we need to revisit 
them, we also need to extend them in order to be able to theoretically analyse the 
nature and functioning of the new organizational forms that are emerging as an 
alternative original way to manage a profession. They challenge our conception of 
collegial organisations.  
Centre de Sociologie des Organisations – FNSP – CNRS 
19 rue Amélie 75 007 Paris – France 
c.musselin@cso.cnrs.fr or s.mignot-gerard@cso.cnrs.fr 
NOTES 
 
1  This agency depends on the French Conference of University presidents. 
2 This discourse is heavily diffused by the media which always describe the French University as “in 
crisis” and which are an open scene for the publication of French intellectuals’ critical opinions on 
the dramatic situation or evolution of French universities (see for instance the paper published by P. 
Bourdieu and C. Charle in April 2000 after the resignation of Claude Allègre, minister of education). 
But is also a recurrent diagnosis that is to be found in many publications in the past (Caullery 1920, 
Colloque de Caen 1956) but also more recently (for instance Lucas 1987, Charle 1994, Renaut 1995, 
Areser 1997, Compagnon 1998…). The main explanation given by most of these authors is that 
French academics never succeeded in sharing a common idea (or ideal) of the University and in 
forming a cohesive academic community.  
3  This is very close to the “constructing organization” process described by N. Brunsson and K. 
Sahlin-Andersson (2000). 
4  We do not have enough room here to develop this point but it led to an increasing financial 
participation of local authorities in the university budget, as well as more normative consequences: 
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for instance some regions are very active in proposing research funding that are allocated through 
“call for proposals”. They are thus having an influence on the research programmes. 
5  This could change in the future: French presidents could be elected for a four year mandate that could 
be renewed one time. 
6  They are elected by all the members of the university belonging to the same category : for instance 
students vote for the students representatives, administrative staff members for administrative 
representatives… 
7  The elections of the bodies and the election of the president do not occur at the same time. It means 
that a president can be elected by bodies in t, and that the bodies’ elections can occur for instance in 
t+2 leading to constitution of new bodies that may be hostile to the president ! 
8  Recently a president who just left his office after a five year period (1996-2001), told us that he 
worked full time as president , that his predecessor (1991-1996) spent 3 days and a half each week in 
the presidential function, and the predecessor of the latter (1986-1991) one to two days a week.  
9  This mainly concerned budget allocation that mostly respected the ministry criteria not because they 
were obliged to, but because it is easier to use them rather than defining new ones. 
10  They generally pay attention to the relevance of the project in terms of the employment possibilities 
for the students. As this is also encouraged by the ministry, an expansion of ob-oriented curricula is 
to be observed. In fact, two evolutions are to be observed about the development of curricula in 
France: first, two levels of regulation (one at the university level and one at the ministry level) 
instead of one (the ministry); second, a development less led by the supply (what academics think it 
is interesting to propose) and thus more demand driven (that is needed by the students, the society, 
the job-matket…).  
11  They do not refuse a lot of them either and this can be explained by two reasons. On one hand, they 
generally prefer asking for modifications than just saying “no”. On the other hand, they are also most 
of the time dealing with projects that have a good chance to be accepted because project leaders 
mostly engage pre-discussions within their faculty and the university to “estimate” the viability of the 
project, but also because the criteria of the CEVU are known and there exists a kind of auto-censure: 
one does not lose time preparing a project that has no chance to meet the required criteria 
12  For instance, in one of the three universities studied by S. Simonet (1999) in her study on curricula 
decision-making, the president clearly expressed that job-oriented curricula related to the Bologna 
declaration would be preferred and this defined the preferences of the CEVU. 
13  H. de Boer (2001) also observed this “dispossession” feeling within Dutch bodies: they not only 
experienced a loss in their attributions but also are more and more confronted to ready-made 
proposals. 
14  This point is based on the section 1.2. of a contribution to be published (cf. Mignot-Gérard and 
Musselin, forthcoming). 
15  These four-year contracts are hardly to be compared with the four-year contracts introduced in 1988 
and that deal with the running budget. The main reason for that is that the former remain a centralised 
discipline-based procedure leaving little autonomy to the university level, while the latter is a 
university-based procedure intending to and succeeding in fostering university autonomy. For the last 
few years now, the two procedures were supposed to be held simultaneously, but they are not really 
coordinated. 
16  Academics sometimes try to escape this constraint and develop alternative solutions for the 
management of their research contracts, solutions that the university does not know about or is 
unable to avoid.  
17  In particular those developed by the GIGUE and then the AMUE: Nabuco for finance and budget, 
Apogée for the management of students (inscriptions, diplomas, statistics…), Harpège for human 
resources management… 
18  Such instruments had two pragmatic consequences. First it formalized the fact of belonging to the 
university: the different parts of the institution are not only linked by the same heating system, but 
also by the same software, the same way of calculating, counting,… Second, it produced information 
(previously unavailable) that on the one hand have been used to express priorities and to legitimate 
them, but that on the other hand are also a kind of reference for accepting or refusing demands.  
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19  The heures complémentaires is a specific budget that allow adjustment between the needed volume 
of teaching hours (based on student inscriptions) and the existing volume (depending on the number 
of teaching positions). This budget is dedicated to the payment of the supplementary hours (called 
heures complémentaires) given by faculty members who have a fixed position (but who should not 
teach more than twice their official teaching duties) or by teachers on time-limited contracts 
(vacataires). 
20  In France, universities are not free to create or reallocate positions as they wish. The ministry is 
responsible for such decisions. Each year the faculties are asked about their needs and they provide 
the ministry with a list of positions ranked by priority. Then the university cross-ranks the demands 
and produces a list of priorities for the whole university, which is sent to the Ministry. If the latter 
decides to create four new positions in a university, the first four ranked positions are created.  
21  The point here is of course not to plea for redistribution per se, but to outline that it is no more 
considered to be the responsibility of the ministry and that universities can make such decisions by 
their own, but also that is much more difficult than before to maintain very unbalanced situations 
when the university is able to produce figures that openly show unbalances. 
22  Four possibilities were offered and they were to be ranked from 1 to 4, 1 for the most important 
criteria and 4 for the least important one. The percentage expresses the number of times the item 
received a “1” compared to the number of times the item was chosen as the more important plus the 
number of time it was chosen as least important.  
23  It follows the number of students but does not lead to a redefinition of the allocation criteria or to 
decision such as maintaining the faculty budget even if numbers decrease because it is a priority 
domain for the university. Nevertheless, in the case of sharp and abrupt increase (as it recently 
occurred in the training of gym teachers), the budget does not strictly follow the number of students 
in order not to unbalance the global equilibrium among the faculties.  
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METHODOLOGICAL ANNEXE 
The qualitative study was led in four French universities, one in Paris and the three 
others in the Province. There were chosen in order to display contrasted situations 
regarding their geographical location, their size, their spectrum of disciplines (in 
France, universities are rarely complete : some are monodisciplinary, including for 
instance only disciplines from the humanities; others are pluridisciplinary and can 
for instance entail a Law and a Medecine Faculty but no Science; some are 
omnidisciplinary or complete). In each case we led semi-directive interviews with 
members of the presidential team, the deans, faculty members, administrative 
members of the university central administration, administrative members at the 
faculty level and elected members of the university deliberative bodies (Governing 
board, Academic council and CEVU). The interviews last about two hours. The 
interviewed are asked about their activity (what it consists of, what is important for 
them, what is of interest for them, the problems they meet), about their relationships 
with other actors (who are their principal interlocutors, why do they have to do with 
these persons, are these relationships good, difficult, conflictual….), and finally 
about their representations of the current situation (are they satisfied about it, what 
could be improved, their wishes…). In each university, we also chose three faculties 
in which we led more interviews and that we investigated more in depth. Within the 
university central administration we also more heavily looked at four services : 
accounting, pedagogical affairs, human resources, budget. 





Uni Est Uni Sud 
Professors 15 26 14 23 
Maîtres de conférences (assistant and 
associate professors) 
9 16 4 10 
Other teachers 2 1 1 2 
Research staff 0 0 8 1 
Administrative staff at the faculty 
level 
12 12 14 13 
Administrative staff at the university 
level 
16 20 15 16 
Total 54 75 56 64 
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Uni Est Uni Sud 
Presidential team  7 11 7 6 
Deans 7 5 6 8 
Directors of research institutes 1 5 8 4 
Elected members at the Governing 
Board 
5 9 7 6 
Elected members at the Academic 
council 
7 5 5 6 
Elected members at the CEVU 5 6 8 5 
Total 32 41 41 35 
 
An intermediary monograph has been written for each university and a 
comparative report was then elaborated. We used these results to prepare a 
questionnaire (including 185 questions with common questions but also specific 
questions for the administrative staff, for the academic staff and for elected members 
of the deliberative bodies), organized in three parts: one on the facultés, one on the 
university level, and one on deliberative bodies. It was sent to 5000 persons 
belonging to 37 universities. The institutions were chosen thank to the quotas 
methodology, using the following criteria : geographical location, number of 
students, students per teachers ratio, number of facultés, date of creation, discipline 
structure (mono, pluri and omni disciplinary). We sent between 110 and 150 
questionnaires per institution and the questionnaires were allocated according to the 
following principle : 10% to members of the presidential team, 13% to 
administrative staff at the university level, 42% in three selected faculties (2/3 of 
them to academics – 1/3 to administrative members), 15% to elected members of the 
Governing board, 10% to elected members of the Academic Council and 10% to 
elected members of the CEVU. 
We received 1660 answers (with a return rate going from 20% to 51% and a 
medium rate of 34%) which were exploited with SPSS. The answers quite well 
respect the national distribution of the scientific disciplines as shown here 
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Table C. Repartion of the academic staff along disciplines 
 Repartition of the academic 
staff by disciplines in France 
(1999) 
Repartition of the academic 
staff by disciplines for the 
received answers 
Sciences 42.1 % 38.7% 




Medecine 15.8% 12.0% 
 
But, the sample suffers from three problems : 
- a slightly over-representation of the administrative staff (especially those at 
the university level) 
- the discipline proportion, which is respected for the global sample, is not 
respected at the level of each institution 
- in some institutions, we observed a large discrepancy between the number 
of answers received from the administrative staff compared to the number 
of answers received from the academic staff. 
Furthermore, the way we constituted the sample favoured university members 
that have elective or management responsibilities in their institution: 76.8% of the 
people who sent the questionnaire back were either members of the presidential 
team, or deans, or directors of department /research institutes, or elected members of 
the university deliberative bodies. Such an orientation was voluntary as a large part 
of the questions concerned the way decisions are made, the role of the different 
levels, of the bodies… The aim of the questionnaire was not primarily to reflect the 
opinions of academic and administrative staff but first of all to elaborate a typology 
of university government in France.  
